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Lecture at the Institute of Physics and Astronomy, University of Aarhus, 30 November 1994
The Chernobyl accident in 1986 - Causes and Consequences
Per Hedemann Jensen
Risø National Laboratory
DK-4000 Roskilde, Denmark
1 Introduction
At the time of the accident, in the early hours of Saturday 26 April 1986, nearly 200 employees
at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant were engaged in the normal operation of Units 1, 2 and 3 and
the experiment at Unit 4 that was to lead to the devastating explosion. A further 300 people were
were working on the night shift to construct two further reactors (Units 5 and 6) about a kilometre
away. At around 01:24 Moscow time, two explosions in quick succession blew the roof off the
Unit 4 reactor building, sending concrete, graphite and debris flying and leaving a gaping hole
exposing the reactor core to the outside air. Smoke and fumes rose over 1 km into the air, together
with a large amount of uranium fuel, transuranics and fission products from the reactor core,
including essentially all the noble gases. The heavy material fell out near the site, but lighter
particles drifted to the west and north of the plant in a radioactive cloud that contaminated the
surface wherever it touched down. The lightest material was carried up by the heat of the explosion
to over 1 km in altitude and was blown to the northwest.
2 Initiating events
Chernobyl Unit 4 had operated successfully for three years, with more than 100 reactor years of
operation for this RBMK1 reactor type. The intent on 25-26 April 1986 was to carry out a special
electrical systems test just prior to taking the Chernobyl Unit 4 out of service for scheduled
maintenance. The purpose of this was to demonstrate improvements in the capacity of the turbine
generators to support essential systems during a major station blackout. This was to be done by
cutting steam supplies to one of the turbine generators and testing the capacity for supply at correct
voltage during its inertial rundown using main coolant flow pumps as the load. The test was
intended as a purely electrotechnical one which was thought to have no impact on nuclear safety.
As a result, the initiative and direction of the test were left to electrical experts. Little emphasis was
put on nuclear safety, and proper authorizations were not obtained.
Start of experiment
At 01:00 on 25 April, preparation for the test was begun by the start of power reduction. At 13:05
the reactor power reached 50% (1,600 MW(th)) and turbogenerator No. 7 was shut down. Shortly
afterwards the Emergency Core Cooling System (EECS) was isolated. The power remained at this
level for about 9 hours. At 23:00 power reduction resumed. The generator power was reduced to
700 MW(th) but it proved difficult and the power level dropped to 30 MW(th) and it was only
1 Reaktor Bolshoy Moshchnosty Kipyaschiy (Large Power Boiling Reactor).
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possible to bring it back to a level of 200 MW(th) by manually withdrawing the control rods. A
power level below 700 MW(th) is forbidden for continuous operation due to the positive power
coefficient for the RBMK reactor below about 20% power level (600 MW(th)). With a positive
power coefficient, small changes in power will lead to much larger changes in steam void, with
consequent power increases.
Block of shutdown signal
The reactor was operating at 200 MW(th), a level which is forbidden for continuous operation. At
01:19 on 26 April the operators increased feedwater flow and having trouble with pressure and
level control, they blocked the shutdown signals associated with steam drum level and pressure.
When the operator decided that the steam drum level was sufficiently high he sharply reduced the
feedwater flow, producing more positive reactivity. The operator received a printout showing that
too many control rods were out of the core and that there was not enough reactivity reserve to meet
the shutdown requirement. The reactor should at this point have been shut down.
Switch off reactor trip system
At 01:23:04 the reactor trip on loss of the second generator was switched off and the emergency
stop valve to the turbine was closed. This was done to allow a repeat of the test if needed. This
was a key violation of the test programme as it was the removal of the last safety system that
would have saved the reactor.
Prompt criticality
At 01:23:30 the power began to increase. The shift foreman ordered shutdown of the reactor at
01:23:40, but by that time it was too late. There was insufficient reactivity left in the control rods
that were in the core, and the others at the top of the core could not be inserted fast enough to
counteract the power increase. The positive void coefficient of reactivity inherent in the RBMK
design continued to add more reactivity and the prompt critical value was exceeded. The power
excursion reached 100 times the full power within four seconds, corresponding to 300,000 MW(th).
Explosion of reactor
An explosion occurred and about 30% of the fuel in the core fragmented, leading to an interaction
with water and subsequent steam production. The explosion lifted the 1,000 tonnes core plate with
subsequent rupture of all fuel channels and the roof of the building was blown off. A second
explosion occurred a few seconds after the first explosion, either as a second power excursion or
as exploding hydrogen. About 25% of the graphite blocks and material from the fuel channels were
ejected through the destroyed roof.
Break out of fire
A fire started in the graphite surrounding the core and also on the roof of the adjoining turbine
building and on the roof of Unit 3. Alarms went out to fire units in the region and within minutes
plant firemen arrived. None of the firemen had been trained in fighting fires involving radioactive
materials. By dawn on Saturday, the more than 100 firemen had succeeded in putting out the roof
fires, and about 05:00 all but the graphite fire in the core had been extinguished. Firemen, rescue
workers and operating personnel were generally unaware of the seriousness of the radiation risk.
The high radiation levels could not be measured with available monitoring equipment and in some
areas the radiation level must have exceeded 100 Gy h-1. Unit 3 was shut down around 03:00, an
hour and a half after the accident, while Units 1 and 2 were not shut down until the following
night, about 24 hours after the accident.
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3 Radionuclide release and accident management
The Chernobyl accident provides a demonstration of several features of radionuclide releases that
had, in the past, been merely predictions and subject to technical controversy. It is now confirmed
that extensive releases of radioactive materials can occur in severe reactor accidents. Furthermore,
it is clear that the materials can be transported considerable distances from the reactor.
Release of activity
The Chernobyl Unit 4 core contained a radioactive inventory of about 4 1019 Bq (109 Ci) at the
time of the accident. On the basis of radiation measurements and various technical analyses of
samples taken from a 30 km radius around the Chernobyl plant and throughout the Soviet Union,
it has been estimated that about 1-2 1018 Bq (3-5 107 Ci) of volatiles were released from the fuel
during the accident and equal amounts of the noble gases xenon and krypton. The noble gases are
thought to have been completely expelled from the fuel. About 10-20% of the volatile radionuclides
iodine, caesium and tellurium were expelled from the fuel. Releases of the more refractory
radionuclides barium, strontium, plutonium, cerium, etc. amounted to 3-6%. The release of
radionuclides did not occur in a single massive event. Rather, only 25% of the release took place
during the first day of the accident. The rest of the release took place as a protracted process over
a nine-day period. The distribution of activity deposited around the Chernobyl was 0.3-0.5% of the
core inventory on-site, 1.5-2% within 20 km, and 1-1.5% beyond 20 km. The time distribution of
the release is shown at Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Release of activity from the Chernobyl reactor in the period 26 April to 7 May
1986.
Accident management operations
On 28 April a massive accident management operation began. This involved dropping various
materials into the reactor well from helicopters. These included boron carbide (B4C) to ensure
against recriticality, dolomite ((MgCa)(CO3)2) to generate carbon dioxide that could provide ’gas
blanketing’ and could contribute to absorbing the energy of the burning graphite, clay/sand to
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introduce an immediate filtration for radionuclides being released and to quench the fire, and lead
to absorb heat by melting and to provide a liquid layer that would solidify to seal and shield the
top of the core vault. In total, about 5,000 tonnes of materials were dropped into the core vault.
Specialist team from Moscow
The authorities in Moscow were alerted about the accident on 26 April and a specialist team was
immediately dispatched to the site to assist local authorities and plant management to deal with the
situation. Initially there were some problems in accurately reporting the severity of the accident
situation at the plant and off-site.
On their arrival the specialist team found a very serious situation. One of the initial
decisions was that a precautionary evacuation of the town of Pripyat should be carried out as soon
as possible. On the morning of 26 April, people were instructed to remain indoors with windows
and doors shot. To prevent the accumulation of radioisotopes of iodine (mostly 131I) from the plume
in the thyroid glands of members of the public, potassium iodide (KI) tablets were distributed to
the population of the surrounding zone. This was done employing to hand the tablets to individual
residents on a door-to-door basis, starting at the morning of 26 April. Late in the night of 26 April,
radiation levels in Pripyat started rising, reaching a value of the order of 10 mSv h-1 on 27 April.
It was therefore decided to evacuate the city.
Evacuation of the city of Pripyat
Around noon on Sunday 27 April, when the evacuation order had been authorized and all
preparations were complete, a short official announcement was broadcast to city residents to pack
provisions for three days and to be ready to leave at 14:00. Finally, the nearly 1,200 buses
assembled near the settlement of Chernobyl (20 km southeast of Pripyat and 17 km southeast of
the plant) set off in a line several kilometres long along the road that passed over the railway just
west of Unit 4.
Evacuation of Pripyat began at 14:00. Buses were provided directly at the entrance of each
building. As soon as each bus was loaded in front of its assigned apartment building, it set off to
join a police escorted line to the reception centres about 50 km away to the west-southwest in
Polesskoe and to the south-southwest Ivankov region of the Kiev district. There was adequate
transport and the evacuation went smoothly. In less than three hours the city was emptied in
orderly fashion of all but those with official duties. The over 44,000 evacuees were taken in by
individual families who lived mostly in settlements in the surrounding regions.
Evacuation of 30-km zone
On 28 April, the Civil Defence Chief of Staff of the USSR proposed the evacuation of the
Chernobyl plant site and the establishment of a 10 km exclusion zone around the plant. On 2 May,
it was decided at a Governmental Commission meeting to evacuate the people from the ’geometric’
30-km zone around the plant, mainly because of the lack of predictions on the radioactive
behaviour under the prevailing meteorological conditions. The evacuation of the entire 30-km zone
was completed by 6 May with a total of 115,000 people. The zone remains evacuated, although
some people have been allowed to go back to their homes in the less contaminated southern areas.
4 Radiation biology
As ionizing radiation passes through human tissue, it can transfer energy and ionize atoms in
cellular molecules that are biologically important for the function of cells. If cellular damage does
occur and is not adequately repaired, it may prevent the cell from surviving or reproducing, or it
may result in a viable but modified cell. The two outcomes have profoundly different implications
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for the organism as a whole, leading to socalled deterministic and stochastic effects. Stochastic
effects are effects that occur at random, i.e. that are of statistical nature. Somatic effects, i.e. effects
in the exposed individual, and prenatal effects in the embryo can be either deterministic or
stochastic. Hereditary effects, i.e. effects in the progeny of the exposed individual, are stochastic.
Deterministic effects
Most organs and tissues of the body are unaffected by the loss of even substantial number of cells,
but if the number lost is very large, there will be observable harm reflecting a loss of tissue
function. If killed cells are not replaced, an acute effect will be clinically observed in the organism
relatively shortly after irradiation. The given level of dose determines whether the effects occur or
not, and a direct cause-effect relation can be clinically demonstrated for the irradiated individual.
The likelihood of effects is zero at doses lower than some threshold dose and increases steeply to
certainty (100%) above such a threshold dose, the severity of the harm is also increasing with dose.
Not all cells in the body are equally radiosensitive and typically cells that divide rapidly are more
radiosensitive than those that divide slowly or not at all (the reason why cancer cells are more
sensitive to radiation than normal cells). Cells that have high sensitivity to radiation include
lymphocytes and immature bone marrow. The dose response for the bone marrow syndrome is
shown at Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Dose response for acute bone marrow syndrome as a function of absorbed whole
body dose2 given over short time.
It appears from Figure 2 that death is almost certain for an individual incurring a whole body dose
of around 6 Gy or more over a short period of time. Doses of around 3 Gy may be lethal for
around half of those in an irradiated population who receive little or no medical care (the median
lethal dose, LD50). For healthy persons receiving good medical care, LD50 may be 5 Gy and as high
as 9 Gy with very intensive medical treatment. For doses below 1 Gy the likelihood of
2 The unit of absorbed dose is Gy (gray). 1 Gy = 1 J kg-1.
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deterministic effects is practically zero.
Stochastic effects
The outcome is very different if the irradiated cell is modified rather than killed. Despite highly
effective biological defence mechanisms, the cloning of cells resulting from the reproduction of a
modified but viable somatic cell may result, after a prolonged and variable time termed latency
period, in the manifestation of a malignant condition, a somatic cancer.
The probability of a somatic carcinogenesis resulting from radiation is assumed to increase
with increments of dose, probably with no threshold of dose below which the probability is zero,
and in a way that is roughly proportional to dose, at least for doses well below the thresholds for
deterministic effects. The severity of the cancer does not depend on the level of dose.
If the damage occurs in a cell whose function is to transmit genetic information to later
generations, any resulting effects, which may be of many different kinds and severities, will
presumably be expressed in the progeny of the exposed person as a hereditary effect. Somatic
carcinogenesis and hereditary effects are termed stochastic effects.
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Figure 3. Dose response for stochastic somatic and genetic effects as a function of equivalent
whole body dose3.
According to the current radiobiological theory, the process leading to a stochastic effect can
originate at any dose level, however small, the probability of occurrence of an effect being
proportional to the incurred dose. This model is termed the linear, no threshold dose-response
relation. The dose response for stochastic effects is shown at Figure 3 as a function of effective
dose.
3 The unit of the equivalent dose is the sievert (Sv). 1 Sv = 1 J kg-1. The relation between the
absorbed dose, D, and the equivalent dose, H, is H = wR D. The radiation weighting factor, wR,
accounts for the different effectiveness of cancer induction per unit absorbed dose of different
radiation types (α-, β-, γ- and n-radiation) (see Appendix).
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Studies of the survivors of the atomic bombings in Japan in 1945 are the most valuable
source of information. Since 1947, the Radiation Effects Research Foundation (RERF), jointly
funded by the governments of Japan and the USA, has closely monitored the medical health
patterns of over 100,000 people who received relatively high doses of whole body radiation. Other
large population study groups include some 200,000 persons who received high doses of radiation
to specific parts of the body.
Although lifetime data for these groups are incomplete, data from the follow-up period are
extensive. In the case of the survivors of the atomic bombings, it is well into its fifth decade. Study
findings for these survivors show a statistically significant increase in the frequency of death due
to leukaemia as well as to many solid cancers. In total, they show that in addition to the around
20,000 of that population would have been expected to incur cancer from ’natural’ causes, around
1,000 incurred cancer that would have been due to doses received as a result of the bombing.
Recently, the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR)
has updated the risk factors for radiation induced cancer due to a revised dosimetry for the
survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the extended observation period and methodological
advances in accounting for different causes of mortality.
Genetic and cytogenetic studies of the nearly 15,000 children born to the atomic bombing
survivors in Japan have so far yielded no evidence of a statistically significant increase in severe
hereditary defects. UNSCEAR has therefore used two largely independent methods (the doubling
dose and the direct method) to estimate the risks to humans of severe hereditary disorders due to
radiation induced gene or chromosomal mutations. The latest risk estimates from UNSCEAR on
genetic and somatic effects are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Summary of estimates of probability of stochastic effects of low radiation doses given
at low dose rates.
Effect Population Probability
Fatal cancers (total) Workers (18-70 years) 4 10-5 mSv-1
Fatal cancers (total) General population 5 10-5 mSv-1
Severe hereditary effects First two generations 1 10-6 mSv-1
Severe hereditary effects All generations 5 10-6 mSv-1
5 The International Chernobyl Project
In October 1989, the Government of the USSR formally requested the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) under the United Nations to carry out:
".... an international experts’ assessment of the concept which the USSR has evolved to
enable the population to live safely in areas affected by radioactive contamination
following the Chernobyl accident, and an evaluation of the effectiveness of the steps taken
in these areas to safeguard the health of the population."
The response from the IAEA was a proposal for a multinational team to undertake an assessment
of the radiological situation in the three affected Soviet Republics - the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic (UkrSSR), the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) and the Russian Federated
7
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Socialist Republic (RSFSR).
The International Chernobyl Project was thus arranged, with the participation of the
Commission of the European Communities (CEC), the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the
United Nations (FAO), the International Labour Office (ILO), the United Nations Scientific
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), the World Health Organisation
(WHO) and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO). The Project was formalized at a
February 1990 meeting in Moscow at the headquarters of the USSR State Committee on the
Utilization of Atomic Energy.
Following a fact finding mission through the affected Republics over the period 25-30
March 1990, an International Advisory Committee of scientists from ten countries and seven
international organizations was established to direct the Project and be responsible for its findings.
Members were called together by international orginasations participating in the Project from well
known institutes and universities to represent a spectrum of disciplines, from the radiation specialist
to the medical practitioner and the psychologist. This twenty-one member Committee met in Kiev
and Minsk from 23 to 27 April 1990 under the chairmanship of Dr. Itsuzo Shigematsu, Director
of the Radiation Effects Research Foundation (RERF) in Hiroshima, Japan. The Committee agreed
upon a detailed work plan. This would be constrained by a compelling need to complete the Project
in one year and by the limitation on the resources available. The Committee would need to rely
on the availability of specialized professionals who would volunteer their time.
The International Chernobyl Project was not intended to have the rigour and comprehensi-
veness of an elaborate long term research study. The intention was to have a multidisciplinary
group of international experts critically examine the extensive information, address the key issues
and put together an understandable picture of the current situation. The goals of the Project, in
short, were to examine assessments of the radiological and health situation in areas of the USSR
affected by the Chernobyl accident and to evaluate measures to protect the population.
The work plan adopted called for examining the validity of the official methodologies and
findings, and independently verifying them through field samples, laboratory analyses and
internationally recognized calculational techniques. The work covered five areas or ’tasks’:
Task 1: Compilation of a historical portrayal of events leading to the current radiologi-
cal situation
Task 2: Evaluation of the environmental contamination assessments
Task 3: Evaluation of the radiation exposure assessments
Task 4: Assessments of clinical health effects from radiation exposure and evaluation
of the general health situation
Task 5: Evaluation of protective measures
The Project selected, in co-operation with local authorities, a number of settlements in the
contaminated areas of concern in order to perform the necessary surveys. Settlements were also
selected outside the contaminated areas of concern to serve as references for comparative purposes.
The Project was carried out on a completely voluntary basis by a closely co-operating team
of some 200 experts associated with research institutes, universities and other organizations in 25
countries and 7 multinational organizations. The time devoted to the Project was volunteered by
governments, institutes, companies or the experts themselves. Nearly 50 missions to the USSR were
completed between March 1990 and January 1991. The IAEA Laboratory at Seibersdorf along with
13 laboratories in six countries participating on a voluntary basis were involved in the collection
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and analysis of samples.
The Project received the full support of the USSR Government and the Governments of
the BSSR, RSFSR and UkrSSR. Assistance took various forms, including the participation of local
scientists in intercomparison exercises, extensive discussions with Project scientists, and assistance
in the collection and preparation of field samples and in carrying out medical examinations of the
population in the affected areas. There were open and frank conversations with authorities,
scientists and especially local citizens that greatly helped the international experts’ understanding
of the situation.
6 Consequences of the accident within the USSR
The Chernobyl accident involved the largest short term release from a single source of radioactive
materials to the atmosphere ever recorded. Aerial radiation measurements and environmental
sampling began shortly after the accident and showed that the highest level of environmental
contamination was in the area around the reactor that would eventually become the prohibited zone.
Radiation doses in the early stages of the accident
Several groups of people had been exposed to radiation at the Chernobyl power station to such an
extent that resulting whole body doses produced various forms of acute radiation syndrome. The
groups included operating personnel of the reactor and electricity generating plant, emergency
squads and to the largest extent the fire brigades fighting the extensive early fires on the site. Acute
radiation syndrome of varying clinical severity was diagnosed in 237 persons, mostly due to
external irradiation with gamma and beta radiation. The estimated whole body doses ranged from
about 2 Gy up to 16 Gy. In total, 28 persons died from acute bone marrow failure and of the
gastro-intestinal syndrome.
In the first weeks after the accident, the significant radiation exposure to the population was
due to the radionuclide 131I. This could have been inhaled from the plume, though that represented
only a minor pathway for population exposure. More important were the drinking of milk from
cows grazing on contaminated pastures and the consumption of contaminated leafy vegetables. The
average absorbed thyroid dose to non-evacuated children were officially reported to be around 2
Gy, with maximum doses up to 30-40 Gy. The distribution of the collective absorbed thyroid doses
as officially reported by the Institute of Biophysics in Moscow are shown in Table 2. The collective
dose for an exposed population is the sum of all individual doses in the population.
Table 2. Collective absorbed thyroid doses in the three affected Republics.
Republic Collective dose (man Gy) Number of people
Russia 30 103 705 103
Ukraine 245 103 1,277 103
Belarus 561 103 466 103
Total 836 103 2,448 103
The 115,000 people who were evacuated from the 30 km zone in the early stage of the accident
from 28 April to 6 May did receive relatively high levels of whole body dose, although no one
developed deterministic effects. Whole body doses were in most cases less than 250 mSv but doses
up to 300-400 mSv did occur. The total collective dose to the evacuated people from the 30 km
9
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zone has been estimated to 16,000 man Sv.
At the beginning of the clean up work on the site, most of the workers called in did not
have personal dosimeters. These workers, also called ’liquidators’, were monitored on a group or
area basis, with judgement providing a basis for deciding how much time an individual could spend
on a given task or in a given area. In total, 600,000 workers - many from military and Civil
Defence - had to be brought in to ensure that no one would exceed the dose limit for emergency
workers of 250 mSv used in the USSR at that time. However, about 10% received higher doses
in the first days of the accident. It is estimated that the collective whole body dose to the
’liquidators’ is about 60,000 man Sv, corresponding to an average individual dose of 100 mSv.
Radiation doses in the later stages of the accident
Heavy rainfalls combined with local conditions to create ’hot spots’ of exceptionally high surface
radioactivity levels. Information from continuing aerial surveys and environmental sampling has
been used to derive official surface contamination maps which displays the ranges of concentration
of caesium, strontium and plutonium. Officially published in 1989, the maps have stirred
controversy among scientists and residents. About 25,000 km2 and 2,225 settlements in the three
Republics are officially defined as having surface contamination density in excess of 185 kBq m-2
(5 Ci km-2).
The external exposure due to deposited radionuclides is, in most areas, the most significant
contributor to dose, especially in those areas where food restrictions have been applied. Project
estimates of doses were made for the surveyed contaminated settlements on the basis of average
deposition results. It could not be assumed that such generalized dose estimation assumptions or
environmental modelling calculations would accurately reflect the local soil conditions, agricultural
practices and living habits in the surveyed contaminated settlements but the results could be
expected to provide a general basis for comparison.
Independent Project estimates for the surveyed contaminated settlements were lower than
the official reported dose estimates. Overall, there is agreement to within a factor of 2-3 between
the independent estimates and the officially reported estimates as shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Individual lifetime effective dose estimates (1986 - 2056) by the International
Chernobyl Project compared to official USSR lifetime dose estimates.
Exposure pathway Project estimate Official estimate
External exposure 60-130 mSv 80-160 mSv
Internal exposure 20-30 mSv 60-230 mSv
Total 80-160 mSv 150-400 mSv
The collective dose commitment within the affected Republics in the former USSR has been
estimated to be 216,000 man Sv. The distribution of the collective dose on different radionuclides
is shown in Table 4.
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Table 4. Collective effective dose commitment within the former USSR from the Chernobyl
accident distributed on radionuclides.
Radionuclide Collective dose commitment (man Sv)
137Cs 155,000
134Cs 43,000
131I 13,000
Short-lived 5,000
Total 216,000
The collective lifetime dose to the population of around 700,000 people living in the most
contaminated areas, i.e. in areas with a surface contamination density with 137Cs greater than 185
kBq m-2 have been estimated to be 54,000 man Sv which is about 25% of the total collective
dose.
The average lifetime dose to this population group is thus of the order of 100 mSv. With
the risk factors given in Table 1 this lifetime dose would correspond to a lifetime risk of fatal
cancer of the order of 0.005. For comparison, the lifetime risk of fatal cancer in a society from all
causes is around 0.2. Also for comparison, the individual lifetime dose from natural occurring
radiation is 150-200 mSv.
Health impact within the USSR
The suspected health impact of the Chernobyl accident has unquestionably been of overriding
concern among the population. There had been continuing reports of a higher incidence of illness
among those residing in the affected areas. Within the International Chernobyl Project a number
of settlements were selected for the medical task force. These settlements were chosen to be
representative of the various communities in the study region. The surveyed control settlements had
socio-economic structures similar to the seven surveyed contaminated settlements. The aim was to
examine various age groups of 20 people each, which, depending on the size of the settlement,
represented between 10 and 80 per cent of the population. Approximately, 250 people were
examined in each settlement. In all, 1356 people were examined.
There were significant non-radiation-related health disorders in the populations of both
surveyed contaminated and surveyed control settlements studied under the Project, but no health
disorders that could be attributed directly to radiation exposure. The accident had substantial
negative psychological consequences in terms of anxiety and stress due to the continuing and high
levels of uncertainty, the occurrence of which extended beyond the contaminated areas of concern.
The children who were examined were found to be generally healthy. Field studies
indicated that there were a significant number of adults in both surveyed contaminated and
surveyed control settlements with substantial medical problems, with 10-15% requiring medical
care.
Reported adverse health effects attributed to radiation have not been substantiated either
by those local studies which were adequately performed or by the studies under the Project.
Available data reviewed did not provide an adequate basis for determining whether there has been
an increase in leukaemia or thyroid cancers as a consequence of the accident. The data were not
detailed enough to exclude the possibility of an increase in the incidence of some tumour types.
On the basis of the radiation doses estimated by the Project and currently accepted radiation risk
estimates, future increases over the natural incidence of all cancers or hereditary effects would be
difficult to discern, even with large and well designed epidemiological studies. Reported estimates
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of absorbed thyroid dose in children are such that there may be a statistically detectable increase
in the incidence of thyroid tumours in the future.
7 Consequences outside the USSR
Although populations were exposed in the countries of Europe and, to a lesser extent, in countries
throughout the Northern hemisphere, the radiation exposures were, in perspective, not of great
magnitude. In Denmark, the first-year dose was approximately 0.02 mSv. For reference, the average
annual effective dose from natural sources is 2.4 mSv. The first-year doses in different European
countries are shown at Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Maximum individual effective doses in different European countries in 1986.
At the time of the accident, surface winds were light and variable, but at 1,500 m altitude the winds
were 8-10 m s-1 from the south. At Risø National Laboratory an ionization chamber was measuring
the outdoor exposure rate as part of a research project. When the data from the measurement series
was read at 28 April, the arrival of the plume at Risø on 27 April was revealed. The ionization
chamber continued to measure the increased radiation level above the natural background. On 7
May, heavy rain washed out the radioactive materials still present in the air over Risø. The
ionization chamber reading for the period 23 April - 23 June 1986 is shown at Figure 5.
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Figure 5. High pressure ionization chamber reading of the outdoor exposure rate at Risø
National Laboratory in the period 23 April - 23 June 1986.
Exposures, mainly from 137Cs, will continue for a few tens of years from the external irradiation
and ingestion pathways. Estimates of dose commitments have been made by UNSCEAR for larger
geographical regions, based on projection models developed from fallout measurements experience.
From the 137Cs deposition versus distance relationship, dose estimates for the entire Northern
hemisphere have been obtained. The estimated collective effective dose commitment from the
accident are shown in Table 5.
Table 5. Collective effective dose commitment outside the former USSR from the Chernobyl
accident distributed on areas.
Area outside the USSR Collective dose commitment (man Sv)
Europe 318,000
Asia 48,000
Rest of world 18,000
Total 384,000
The collective dose commitment for Europe of 318,000 man Sv is calculated for a population of
487 million people. The average individual dose commitment can thus be calculated to be around
0.7 mSv, varying between 0.2 and 1 mSv. For comparison, the individual dose commitment from
natural sources would be of the order of 200 mSv.
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8 Conclusions
The accident at Chernobyl had a societal impact unparalleled in industrial history. The early
consequences resulted in the evacuation of more than 100,000 people and involved hundreds of
thousands of rescue workers. Vast populations in the Republics of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia
continue to live with stress and anxiety due to the lingering uncertainty about the future.
The unprecedented nature and scale of the accident obliged the responsible authorities to
respond to a situation that had not been planned for and was not expected. Thus, many early
actions had to be improvised. The general response of the authorities in this phase seems to be
reasonable and consistent with internationally established guidelines prevailing at the time of the
accident.
The protective measures taken or planned for the longer term, albeit well intentioned,
generally exceeded what would have been strictly necessary from a radiation protection viewpoint.
The relocation and foodstuff restrictions should have been less extensive. It should be recognized,
however, that there are many social and political factors to be taken into consideration, and the
final decision must rest with the responsible authorities.
There are many important psychological problems of anxiety and stress related to the
accident and these seems to be wholly disproportionate to the biological significance of the
radioactive contamination. These problems are prevalent even in non-contaminated areas. Review
of USSR data indicates that reported cancer incidence rate has been rising since the early eighties
and has continued to rise since the accident. The International Chernobyl Project considered that
there had been incomplete reporting in the past and could not assess whether the rise is due to
increased incidence, methodological differences, better detection and diagnosis or other causes.
The thyroid doses to children are such that there may be a statistically detectable increase
in the incidence of thyroid tumours in the future. In fact, there are now indications of thyroid
cancers in children induced by the exposure to iodine released from the accident. The type of
thyroid cancer is one which would be expected from radiation exposure. On the basis of the
radiation doses from the accident and currently accepted radiation risk estimates, future increases
over the natural incidence of all cancers or hereditary effects would be difficult to discern, even
with large and well designed epidemiological studies. Reported estimates of absorbed thyroid dose
in children are such that there may be a statistically detectable increase in the incidence of thyroid
tumours in the future.
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Appendix
Radiation dose quantities and units
A1 Absorbed dose
As radiation penetrates any material, its energy is absorbed and released by the constituent atoms.
The absorbed radiation energy per unit mass of material is termed the absorbed dose, D. The SI
unit is the gray (Gy), one gray being equal to one joule energy absorbed per kilogram of matter.
The effects of radiation on any material, including biological material such as tissue, depend on
the magnitude of the absorbed dose. The absorbed dose can be defined in terms of the related
stochastic quantity energy imparted, ε. The energy imparted by ionizing radiation to matter of mass,
m, in a finite volume, V, is defined as:
where (Rin)u and (Rout)u are the radiant energies (particle energy excluding rest energy) of uncharged
particles entering and leaving V, (Rin)c and (Rout)c are the radiant energies of charged particles
entering and leaving V, and ΣQ is the net energy derived from rest mass in V (m→E positive,
E→m negative). The absorbed dose, D, is defined at any point P in V as:
where ε is now the expectation value of the energy imparted in the finite volume V, dε is that for
an infinitesimal volume dV at point P, and dm is the mass in dV. Thus the absorbed dose D is the
expectation value of the energy imparted to matter per unit mass at a point.
A2 Radiation weighting factor
Radiation effects, including harm to tissue, are found to depend not only on the absorbed dose, but
also on the type and energy of the radiation causing the dose. For radiation protection purposes,
these factors are taken into account by weighting the absorbed dose in tissue by a factor related
to the relative biological effectiveness of the radiation of causing cancer. The weighting factor for
this purpose is termed the radiation weighting factor, wR, and it reflects both radiation type and
energy. Radiation weighting factors are shown in Table A1.
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Table A1. Radiation weighting factors, wR, for different radiation types.
Radiation type Radiation weighting factor, wR
Photons, all energies
Electrons and muons, all energies
Alpha particles
Neutrons, depending on energy
1
1
20
5 - 20
A3 Equivalent dose
The absorbed dose weighted by the radiation weighting factors is termed the equivalent dose, H,
in a tissue or organ, T, is given by the expression:
where DT,R is the mean absorbed dose in tissue or organ T due to radiation type R. The unit of
equivalent dose is the sievert (Sv), where 1 Sv = 1 J kg-1. Equivalent doses are additive regarding
the radiation risk of stochastic effects. The equivalent dose is relevant only for doses in the low
dose region below the threshold doses for deterministic effects.
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